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Abstract: It is consistent with the evidence in The Origin of Concepts to
conjecture that infants’ causal representations, like their numerical
representations, are not continuous with adults’, so that bootstrapping
is needed in both cases.
Representations involving causation play a special role in The
Origin of Concepts, grounding Carey’s view that there are
“central representational systems with innate conceptual
content that is distinct from that of core cognition systems”
(Carey 2009, p. 246). For infants’ causal representations are
held to be innate but not grounded in core cognition, unlike rep-
resentations of objects, numbers, and agents, which do involve
core cognition. After discussing the distinction between core cog-
nition and central representational systems, I shall argue, contra
Carey, that infants’ causal cognition might depend on core cogni-
tion after all. This matters for two reasons. First, we are left
without a clear case of innate representation outside core cogni-
tion. Second, it suggests that, as in the case of number (see Ch.
8), there may be a developmental discontinuity between
infants’ and adults’ causal notions. If so, understanding “how
the human capacity for causal representation arises” (Carey
2009, p. 216) will require explaining how humans bootstrap
themselves across the discontinuity.
Let me first outline part of what motivates the distinction
between core and central cognition. Officially, core cognition is
characterised by six properties (pp. 67–68), but for my purposes
it is useful to start from motivation for one aspect of the distinc-
tion. At what age do infants typically first know that solid barriers
stop rolling balls? This is a hard question because, as Carey
explains, there is compelling evidence for apparently inconsistent
answers. Infants’ looking behaviours reveal that infants have
different expectations about the trajectories of objects depending
on the presence and positions of solid barriers (Baillargeon et al.
1995; Carey 2009, pp. 76ff.; Spelke & Van de Walle 1993; Wang
et al. 2003). Yet at 212 years, their reaching behaviours system-
atically indicate a failure to understand interactions (Berthier
et al. 2000; Carey 2009, pp. 111–15; Hood et al. 2003). Carey’s
view involves distinguishing “two kinds of knowledge” (p. 115)
or “two types of conceptual representations” (p. 22). There are
principles that are known (or, better, cognised [pp. 10–11]) in
this sense: Abilities to individuate and track objects exploit the
approximate truth of these principles. We can explain the sensi-
tivity of infants to solid barriers on the hypothesis that they do
know that solid barriers stop rolling balls in this sense of knowl-
edge: Where the principle that solid barriers stop rolling balls is
violated, infants cannot compute a continuous trajectory for an
object, and their attention is drawn to it for the same sorts of
reasons that cause them to attend to anomalous appearances
and disappearances (p. 140). But in another sense, principles
are known only if they can serve as reasons that explain and
justify purposive actions, or only if they could in principle
become elements in intuitive theories with explanatory potential
(Ch. 10). We can explain the failure of 2-year-olds’ reaching
behaviours to deal with solid barriers on the hypothesis that
they do not know that solid barriers stop rolling balls in this
sense of knowledge.
If (as I think) Carey’s interpretation of these apparently con-
flicting findings is right, we must be cautious when attributing
knowledge, concepts, or representations. This applies to the
case of causation. Some of the best evidence for causal
representations in infancy comes from extensions of Michotte’s
launching paradigm (Carey 2009, p. 218). What is the nature of
these representations? Abilities to individuate and track objects
involve sensitivity to cues to object identity such as continuity
of movement and distinctness of surfaces. As Michotte noted,
the causal representations he identified arise when there is a con-
flict between these cues (Michotte 1946/1963, p. 51). This and
other evidence (see Butterfill 2009, pp. 420–21, for a review)
suggests that we can characterise Michottian causal phenomena
in roughly the same way that Carey characterises infants’ knowl-
edge that solid barriers stop rolling balls: it is a side-effect
(although perhaps a developmentally significant one) of the com-
putations involved in core cognition of objects.
I have not yet suggested anything inconsistent with Carey’s
position. I also accept her arguments that (1) infants’ causal rep-
resentations are not limited to mechanical interactions and that
(2) the Michottian phenomena are not “the [only] source of the
human capacity for causal representations” (Carey 2009,
p. 243; Saxe & Carey 2006). However, I do object to Carey’s argu-
ment for the further claims that (3) “not all of an infant’s earliest
causal representations are modular” (p. 240) and that (4) infants
“make complex causal inferences” (p. 242). The argument for all
four claims hinges on an impressive series of studies showing that
infants can represent causal interactions involving changes of
state as well as of location, that they are sensitive to colliding
objects’ size or weight, and that they expect animate and inani-
mate objects to occupy different causal roles. These findings
support (1) and (2) but not (3) and (4). Why not? Carey is
surely right that these findings cannot be explained by supposing
that there is core cognition of (or a module for) causation. But
this is compatible with the hypothesis that sensitivity to causal
principles is a feature of several individual modules. That many
possibly modular processes require sensitivity to causal principles
does not imply that any such principles are central. For example,
cognition of speech is sometimes thought to be modular
(Liberman & Mattingly 1991) and might even be characterised
as a species of core cognition. Speech cognition involves sensi-
tivity to causation in ways analogous to those discussed in The
Origin of Concepts. For example, it requires categorising things
by whether they are potential producers of speech, and identify-
ing which bits of speech are coming from a single source. In
fact, on one view, cognition of speech involves identifying the
phonetic activities most likely to be causing observable sounds
and movements (Liberman & Mattingly 1985). By itself, this is
neither evidence for the existence of non-modular causal
representations, nor for causal representations that are not
aspects of core cognition.
But why think that causal representations are initially all
embedded in core cognition?
As in the case of number, the answer concerns signature limits.
Children in their second and third years of life show limited abil-
ities to reason explicitly about the causal powers of solid objects
and of agents. The principle considered earlier, that solid barriers
stop rolling balls, is as much about causation as it is about objects.
If infants’ causal representations were nonmodular and if infants
could make complex causal inferences, how could they fail to
appreciate that solid barriers stop rolling balls?
If it is possible that infants’ and adults’ causal representations
are discontinuous in the same sense that their numerical rep-
resentations are (Ch. 4 and 8), how might humans bootstrap
themselves across the discontinuity? In the case of number,
numeral lists and counting routines play a key role. Tool use
may play an analogous role in bootstrapping causal represen-
tations. Basic forms of tool use may not require understanding
how objects interact (Barrett et al. 2007; Lockman 2000),
and may depend upon core cognition of contact-mechanics
(Goldenberg & Hagmann 1998; Johnson-Frey 2004). Experience
of tool use may in turn assist children in understanding notions
of manipulation, a key causal notion (Menzies & Price 1993;
Woodward 2003).
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Perhaps, then, non-core capacities for causal representation
are not innate, but originate with experiences of tool use.
Concepts are not icons
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Abstract: Carey speculates that the representations of core cognition are
entirely iconic. However, this idea is undercut by her contention that core
cognition includes concepts such as object and agency, which are
employed in thought as predicates. If Carey had taken on board her
claim that core cognition is iconic, very different hypotheses might
have come into view.
In her book, Carey (2009) says that the elements of core cogni-
tion include some very basic concepts, such as the concept
object (p. 41) and the concept agent (p. 186). She also says that
the representations of core cognition have an “iconic” format
(pp. 68, 458). This appears to be a contradiction, because concep-
tual representations, even as Carey understands them, cannot be
iconic. I vote for a resolution in favor of iconic format.
Carey says that concepts are “units of thought, the constituents
of beliefs and theories” (p. 5) and that “words express concepts”
(p. 247). Moreover, she frequently interprets infants as using
their concepts as predicates, in thinking of something as an
object or as an agent (pp. 41, 187, 268). Thus, concepts, for
Carey, appear to be components of the sorts of thoughts we
can express in sentences. If an infant possesses the concept
object, then it can think a thought that we can express in words
thus: “That is an object.” That does not mean that only creatures
that have language possess concepts, or that all concepts are
word-like symbols, which Carey would deny (p. 68).
Iconic representations are mental images. Iconic represen-
tations do not represent only sensory qualities such as color
and shape, as Carey well knows (p. 135). Mental images can rep-
resent a sequence of events among objects. Our understanding of
objects may consist largely in our being disposed to imagine that
events will unfold in certain ways rather than others (p. 460). If I
imagine a ball disappearing behind a screen and the screen
coming down to reveal that very ball, I represent the ball as per-
sisting through time and as hidden behind an occluder; in doing
so, I utilize knowledge of object permanence. In imagining a
hand striking a box behind an occluder, I may exercise an under-
standing of causation.
Iconic representations are never concepts. Iconic represen-
tations of a red ball and a blue ball do not represent what the
two balls have in common, as the concept ball does. A concept,
such as dog, has an argument place. By substituting a represen-
tation of a particular object into that place, we can form a
whole thought, such as that Fido is a dog. An iconic represen-
tation does not have an argument place. There could be a kind
of thinking in pictures in which a mental image of a collie did
the work of the concept dog in forming the sorts of thoughts
we express in English with the word “dog.” But in that case,
the mental image of a collie would cease to be an iconic represen-
tation of a particular collie. There are iconic representations of
objects, but no iconic representation is the concept object.
Carey frequently infers that a representation is conceptual on
the grounds that it cannot be defined in terms of sensory and
spatiotemporal qualities and has an “inferential role” (pp. 97,
115, 171, 449). Infants’ representations of objects are not
merely representations of statistical relations between sensory
qualities (p. 34), and they are intermodal (p. 39). In saying that
a representation has an inferential role, she does not mean that
it is governed by rules of inference defined over strings of
symbols (p. 104). She means that it guides expectations (p. 61)
and is integrated into several domains of cognition (p. 95). The
concept object has an inferential role inasmuch as “objects are
represented as solid entities in spatial and causal relations with
each other” (p. 103).
But these considerations do not persuasively argue that the
representations of core cognition can also be used as predicates.
In expecting that there will be two objects behind the screen, not
one, the child may be simply imagining two objects. There is no
need to suppose that the child judges of each that it is an object
and distinct from the other. An imagistic representation of the
arrangement behind the screen may be a consequence of the
infant’s understanding of the way objects behave; it is not
merely a synthesis of sensory qualities. It can integrate contri-
butions from several sensory modalities. An imagistic represen-
tation can demonstrate an understanding of causal and
numerical relations. That understanding can take the form of
an imagistic understanding of what one can expect to perceive
in the course of observing real objects. An infant can represent
an object as solid without judging that it is solid by imagining
that it will behave as solid objects in fact behave.
Carey introduces yet a third kind of representation, object files
(p. 70). She thinks it’s useful to imagine that the infant keeps a file
on each object that it perceives, in which it stores information
about that object’s past. But an object file is not iconic, because
an iconic representation is not a thing in which information is col-
lected. And an object file is not the concept object, which we
might put to use in representing every object. Yet in Carey’s
thinking, the notion of object file seems to blur the distinction
between concept and iconic representation (p. 459).
Carey frequently attributes to infants a kind of conceptual
thought that is not in any way reducible to iconic representation.
She thinks experiments show that infants classify objects as
agents (p. 186). In comparing explanations of looking-time
studies of infants’ reactions to causal scenarios, she pits an expla-
nation in terms of the general concept cause against an expla-
nation in terms of generalizations “stated over perceptual
features” (p. 241). In considering how infants might solve indivi-
duation problems, the only options she considers are that they
conceive of objects as falling under kinds and that they conceive
of them as having properties (pp. 268–70). None of the options
on offer is an explanation in terms of iconic representations.
If Carey had taken on board her own claim that core cognition
employs iconic representations, then very different hypotheses
might have come into view. Quite generally, an infant’s under-
standing of the world might take the form of its being disposed
to imagine certain sequences of events in preference to others.
It is not obvious that skills in imagination can only be explained
as deriving from prior conceptualizations.
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Abstract: This article defends a continuity position. Infants can abstract
numerosity and young preschool children do respond appropriately to
tasks that tap their ability to use a count and cardinal value and/or
arithmetic principles. Active use of a nonverbal domain of arithmetic
serves to enable the child to find relevant data to build knowledge
about the language and use rules of numerosity and quantity.
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